

DELHI

THROUGH THE AGES

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*Peter Jackson, "Delhi:
The Problems of a Vast
Military Encampment"*

in Khurāsān and Central Asia—whether bureaucrats, soldiers, scholars, or mystics—who fled from the Mongol terror; and Itutmish, at least, followed a policy of actively encouraging them to settle in his capital.⁴ Delhi's growth during the thirteenth century is largely attributable to this influx, which was swollen, after the outbreak of civil war within the Mongol empire around 1261, by groups of Mongol fugitives also.⁵ By the 1290s Delhi's suburbs sprawled along the banks of the Yamuna, where the quarters of Indrapat, Kīlōkhī (attested as early as 1237 and described in 1260 as 'the new town'), Ghiyāthpūr and Talūka were at this time receiving a further body of Mongol settlers who had entered the service of Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn Khaljī.⁷

We possess no statistics for the population of Delhi in the Middle Ages, and the details that have come down to us are all derived from foreign observers of the fourteenth century. The Moroccan Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, who resided in the city for much of the period 1333–42, has left us his testimony as to its vast extent and population.⁸ Roughly contemporaneous were the informants of the Egyptian encyclopaedist al-Umarī (d. 1349), who credits Delhi with a circumference of forty miles.⁹ It contained, he was told, seventy hospitals and a thousand *madrasas*;¹⁰ though the latter figure is surely exaggerated, and more reliance may be placed on the number sixty or seventy furnished by another Egyptian contemporary, al-Mufaddal.¹¹ Delhi clearly struck the imagination of all its visitors; and it is not surprising that the Indian historian Baranī (wrote c. 1357), who regrettably lacks the precision of these external observers, equates it with Cairo and Baghdad.¹² By this time, moreover, a century of Mongol invasions had thrown into relief the city's function of being not simply an administrative capital and a commercial metropolis, but a vast armed camp. The origins of this development are to be found during the reign of Sultan Alā al-Dīn Khaljī (1296–1316).

The first Mongol invasions of the Sultanate's territory had not penetrated further than the western Punjab, where by the reign of Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balban (1266–86) the frontier appears to have lain along the river Bēās.¹³ The Mongol raids of Balban's era were the work of an independent grouping known as the Negüderis or Qaraunas, based locally in what is now Afghanistan.¹⁴ Towards the end of the century, however, they were brought under the control of the great Central Asian Khanate headed by Qaidu and Dua,¹⁵ resulting in a sudden increase in Mongol striking power.

DELHI: The Problem of a Vast Military Encampment

PETER JACKSON

The Sultanate of Delhi, properly so called, dates from the reign of Shāms al-Dīn Itutmish (A.D. 1211–36). When the last great Ghurid ruler Muizz al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sām was murdered in 1206 and his empire began to disintegrate, it was at Lahore—traditionally the administrative centre of the Indian provinces under both the Ghaznawid and the Ghurid dynasties—that his Turkish slave lieutenant Aybeg assumed the canopy of state; and there too that he died four years later.¹ For Fakhr-i Mudabbir, who wrote during Aybeg's reign, Lahore was still the capital of Muslim India²; and only through the action of Itutmish, Aybeg's governor at Budaon, who seized power in a *coup* at Delhi following his master's death, did this freshly conquered Hindu city become a Muslim capital. That it remained so was due to a combination of circumstances. Firstly, several years elapsed before Itutmish was able definitively to occupy Lahore and the western Punjab.³ And secondly, his annexation of Bengal in 1230–1 secured him the status of Islam's sole protagonist in the subcontinent, the ruler of an empire which both extended much further to the east than that of Aybeg or the Ghurids and also was facing a considerably greater threat on its north-west flank. In view of the growing pressure of the Mongols beyond the Indus, the ideal centre of the infant Indo-Muslim polity was not Lahore but Delhi; a circumstance incidentally emphasised by the Mongols themselves when they took and sacked Lahore in 1241. This was their first attack on the territory of the Sultanate itself. Thereafter they are known to have invaded the Punjab and on occasions even Hindūstān, in 1245–6, 1257–8, 1285, 1287, 1292, 1297–8, 1299–300, 1303, 1305, c. 1306, c. 1322 and c. 1329.^{3a}

Mongol pressure contributed in a more positive fashion, however, to Delhi's primacy. The city fast became the natural refuge for those

From Alā al-Dīn's reign, the entire Dōāb, and even territory beyond the Ganga, lay within range of the Mongols' depredations. In 1299–1300 Dua's son Qutluḡ Qoḡa invaded India and moved directly on Delhi, abandoning the usual practice of ravaging the country en route, and advancing by forced marches in order to gain the maximum advantage from a surprise blow.¹⁶ He was checked only at Kili, a locality which is now unknown but which appears to have lain not far south of Sāmāna.¹⁷ The Mongol prince died on the return march,¹⁸ but in 1303 his lieutenant Taraghai advanced to the very outskirts of Delhi and subjected the city to a two-month investment.¹⁹ A subsequent inroad by two Mongol generals Ali Beg and Tartaq in 1305 avoided the capital itself, but ravaged large tracts to the north and east, including Budaon and Avadh, and was defeated in the vicinity of Amrōha.²⁰ After this, there appear to have been no major invasions until the time of Sultan Muḥammad b. Tughluq (1325–51), when the Central Asian ruler Tarmashirin, a younger son and successor of Dua, swept across the Dōāb and devastated the territory at least as far as Mirath (Meerut).²¹ Barani attributes the respite gained after about 1306 to the efficacy of Alā al-Dīn's military and administrative reorganization,²² when in fact the Mongols' own internal dissensions must have been at least equally responsible, just as they were again to prevent further invasions after that of Tarmashirin for the remainder of Muḥammad b. Tughluq's reign.²³ The importance of Alā al-Dīn's measures for us lies elsewhere, in their contribution to the increasingly militaristic character of the Sultanate and more particularly in their effect upon the status of Delhi.

The manpower of India had long been proverbial throughout Western Asia,²⁴ and the Delhi Sultans inherited the aggregate capacity of a number of major Hindu potentates to put enormous armies into the field. When the envoys of the Mongol prince Hülegü visited Delhi in 1260, Ulugh Khān—the future Sultan Balban—took pains to overawe them by staging a review of some 200,000 foot and 50,000 horse.²⁵ How far these represented principally the entire forces stationed in and around the capital, and to what extent Balban had been obliged to draw on levies from the *iqṭās*, we cannot say: Jüzjāni describes the troops as being brought both 'from the provinces and from about the vicinity of the court' (*az aṭraf wa ḥawālī-yi ḥaḍrat-i alā*). Subsequently, Balban was able to review an army of 200,000 men at Avadh, on his way to crush a revolt in Bengal.²⁶ Alā al-Dīn's reign appears to have witnessed a considerable increase in the military

establishment.²⁷ Iranian sources at the beginning of the fourteenth century report that his forces stood at more than 300,000,²⁸ while two decades later the current size of the Delhi army is given as 475,000.²⁹ Under Muḥammad b. Tughluq, who is alleged to have built up an unprecedentedly large force within a very short space for his so-called Khurāsān project,³⁰ the figures which reached the West are even more impressive. Iranian authors supply no details of the Sultanate's military establishment for this period, and we are dependent on Arabic writers who clearly benefited from the opening up of diplomatic relations between Egypt and India around 1330. Umari was told that Muḥammad's troops in the capital and the provinces totalled 900,000.³¹ The slightly later author al-Ṣafadī (d. 1363), however, who reproduces this figure on the authority of an official envoy from Muḥammad to the Mamlūk Sultan al-Nāṣir, is sceptical, adding that the true number is reputed to be nearer 600,000.³² The figure of forty lakhs (four million) for the infantry given, finally, by Mufaddal is doubtless due to a confusion of units and should doubtless stand at 400,000: his 300,000 for the horsemen would then produce a total of 700,000, which harmonizes more closely with the testimony of other sources.³³ In these circumstances, Barani's details concerning the force of 470,000 destined for the Khurāsān project³⁴ clearly apply to a specially raised contingent which was distinct from the provincial levies,³⁵ such a temporary increase may well account for the extraordinarily high figure of 900,000 which Ṣafadī rejected.

The priority given to the maintenance of such vast armies entailed certain consequences. If the troops were to be paid regularly, the Sultan required a considerable revenue; and furthermore they had to be kept occupied and in training.³⁶ One way in which the latter aim was accomplished was through hunting expeditions in which large army detachments participated,³⁷ a practice which may even have been inspired by the Mongol example.³⁸ But the most effective means whereby these enormous armies could be both raised and kept active was undoubtedly regular campaigning against the Hindus. The Mongol threat appears in some sense to have reversed the order of priorities within the framework of military policy. In its early years the Sultanate's chief task had been one of maintaining the offensive against the infidel powers of the subcontinent. But as far back as 1247 Jüzjāni portrays Ulugh Khān Balban as advocating a policy of raiding Hindu territory not merely in order to chastise the idolator but to amass booty which could then be used to maintain a defensive army

in the face of Mongol attacks from the north.³⁹ The fact that Jüzjāni wrote as a contemporary, and still more his proximity to Balban, make it very likely that these words indicate the adoption of a conscious policy on the part of Delhi's rulers following the intensification of Mongol pressure after 1240. The passage contrasts sharply with the more simplistic statement of Baranī, who represents Balban, when Sultan, as refusing to launch campaigns against the Hindus as long as the Mongol menace persisted.⁴⁰ And we have good reason to distrust him again when he describes how Taraghai's great invasion of 1303 induced Alā al-Dīn to give up 'campaigning and taking fortresses' (*laṣṣhar-kaṣṣh' wa ḥiṣār-gīrī*).⁴¹ On Baranī's own admission, this was simply not the case. Even were we to disregard the expeditions which Alā al-Dīn personally led against Sevāna (1308) and Jālōr (c. 1311), and to which Baranī makes only the briefest reference,⁴² the notice he gives of Malik Kāfūr's campaign in the south would alone demonstrate that the above statement is worthless. A certain amount of successful—and lucrative—military activity against the independent Hindu states, far from being a drain on the Sultanate's resources and an irrelevant distraction to its rulers, was a vital factor in its strategy for survival. The real problems arose only when plundering campaigns were abandoned in favour of outright annexation, a development which was accelerated from 1318.⁴³ Launching regular attacks upon enemy territory in order largely to finance a sizeable standing army for defence elsewhere was one matter; it was quite another to maintain garrisons and a civil administration in a conquered province, with all the additional expense involved.⁴⁴ Newly acquired provinces, moreover, could not be treated in the same rapacious manner that characterizes warfare in enemy country. With the imposition of direct rule over vast new regions in the south, therefore, the Delhi Sultans effectively suffered a loss which was twofold. In all likelihood, it was to be one of the factors underlying the economic difficulties of Muhammad b. Tughluq's reign.

The mere accumulation of vast stocks of specie in the Sultan's treasury, however, was in itself insufficient. Like any other large city, Delhi suffered periodically from famine brought on by crop failure in its hinterland,⁴⁵ on which it was increasingly dependent. Balban at least had laid up stores of rice and millet in the capital in order to meet such emergencies;⁴⁶ but in a real crisis they can scarcely have proved adequate. Significantly, prior to Timūr's invasion in 1398 the Mongol attack which came nearest to success was that of

Taraghai, who secured the Yamuna crossings and so cut the city's supply lines.⁴⁷ Muhammad b. Tughluq was to profit from this lesson to maintain communications with the eastern provinces during Tarmaṣhīn's invasion by establishing his headquarters at Indrapat.⁴⁸ But even at times of comparative peace, a large standing army—particularly when a significant proportion of it was quartered in the capital and its environs—necessitated regular supplies of foodstuffs and clothing materials at low prices. Alā al-Dīn, again, is the first monarch known to have enacted economic measures specifically for the sake of the military establishment. The entire Dōāb region, together with the provinces of Amrōha and Kābar immediately east of the Ganga, was resumed from the existing grantees and brought into the category of state land (*khālīṣa*), and the whole of the revenue demand (*maḥṣūl*) earmarked for the upkeep of the troops and of the state industries (*kārkhānahā*).⁴⁹ The *khārāj* of the Dōāb was to be paid, moreover, in grain rather than in cash as previously;⁵⁰ and Baranī tells us at another point that the level was fixed at half the produce—in other words, at the maximum allowed according to the Hanifite school.⁵¹ We cannot discount the possibility that the Sultan's vigorous campaign against the manufacture and consumption of wine and drugs, the success of which would entail a loss of revenue,⁵² was in part designed to encourage concentration within the agrarian sector on cereal production.⁵³ However this may be, Alā al-Dīn appears, by dint of increasing the capacity of the state granaries and of giving Delhi a virtual monopoly on the purchase of vital commodities other than grain, to have ensured low prices for the capital, and hence for the army, during the remainder of his reign.⁵⁴

One of the effects of Alā al-Dīn's policies had been to reduce, to a large extent, the power of intermediaries between the central government and the cultivators. But his policies were abandoned under his immediate successors. His son Qutb al-Dīn Mubārak Khālījī (1316–20) reduced the *khārāj*, allowed prices to rise once more, and was obliged in consequence to increase the pay of the troops,⁵⁵ while in addition some of the lands resumed under Alā al-Dīn were again alienated.⁵⁶ And although Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tughluq (1320–25) instituted inquiries into certain of these grants,⁵⁷ his reign appears on balance to have witnessed concessions to the nobility and a corresponding curtailment of royal power in relation to the peasants.⁵⁸ It is against the background of these two developments—a contraction in the state's resources and an erosion of its effective control over what

remained—that we must view the economic measures of Muḥammad b. Tughluq, who was obliged to interfere with the existing land-revenue system in the Dōāb in order to support the rapid expansion of his military establishment.

The exact proportions of the increase in the demand are obscure. Baranī's vague phraseology, suggesting either a five to ten per cent increase or one of ten- to twenty-fold, was dismissed by Moreland as a mere rhetorical device.⁵⁹ Certainly, any increase in the *kharāj*, following so soon on Tarmaṣhīrīn's devastation of the province,⁶⁰ would have provoked severe discontent, even had the level of taxation been less harsh than the fifty per cent demanded under Alā al-Dīn. But there are two points worth noticing. Firstly, Baranī's earlier recension (which is even vaguer, incidentally, regarding the size of the increase) demonstrates that what the Dōāb cultivators found particularly irksome was that they were being asked to pay at least a part of the new assessment in cash⁶¹ (rather than the whole in kind as under Alā al-Dīn). And secondly, his phrasing elsewhere suggests that we are here dealing with an increase not only in the *kharāj* but also in the *jizya*, which had now evidently ceased to be a simple poll-tax and was assessed on income.⁶² Possibly these two circumstances help to account for the violent reaction of the Dōāb's inhabitants; but we cannot be certain. If, however, the nature of the new requisitions has caused confusion, greater still has been that surrounding the context of the increase. Only Moreland attempted to place the Dōāb assessment in the context of Muḥammad's other measures, and his analysis was based on a misunderstanding. In linking it—correctly—with the so-called transfer of capital from Delhi to Dēōgīr (Daulatābād), he assumed that Delhi was left deserted and that consequently there was no market for the extra produce.⁶³ But this is to be misled by the hyperboles of Iṣāmī and, in places, of Baranī. Let us examine the Daulatābād project.

The old city of Delhi had been repeatedly abandoned by different Sultans, beginning with Muizz al-Dīn Kaiqubād (1286–90), who built a new palace at Kīlōkhrī on the Yamuna and thereby provoked an exodus by the grantees in turn.⁶⁴ Kīlōkhrī remained the capital during the early years of the Khaljī dynasty, since the new regime was viewed with considerable hostility in the old city,⁶⁵ and in fact there is no evidence that the seat of government was restored to Delhi until Alā al-Dīn's accession.⁶⁶ Delhi's exposed position was highlighted in the course of Taraghai's invasion, and Alā al-Dīn subsequently moved

his residence to Sīrī, to the north-east, which had served as his headquarters during both the recent campaign and Qutluḡ Qoḥṡa's earlier attack.⁶⁷ Here he began the construction of a new fortress, which was to be completed only in the reign of Qutb al-Dīn,⁶⁸ while at the same time the dilapidated walls of old Delhi were restored.⁶⁹ A third fortified residence, Tughluqābād, situated four or five miles to the east and named after its founder Ghiyāth al-Dīn, ceased to be the capital following the accession of Muḥammad, who temporarily moved back into the old city;⁷⁰ though we shortly find him storing at Tughluqābād at least a part of his treasury.⁷¹ Muḥammad himself set about further building, adding a smaller fortress, Ādilābād, to Tughluqābād and linking old Delhi to Sīrī in 1327 by means of walls which enclosed an area known henceforward as Jahān-panāh.⁷² It is clear from Ibn Baṭrūta's narrative that like his Khaljī predecessors Muḥammad resided in the palace of Hazār Surūn, which had been built by Alā al-Dīn outside the Sīrī fortress and lay within this new settlement.⁷³ According to the same author, Muḥammad had intended at one point to surround all four 'cities' (that is, old Delhi, Sīrī, Jahān-panāh, and Tughluqābād) with one enormous wall, but was compelled to relinquish the idea in view of the expense involved.⁷⁴

This extensive building programme hardly supports the view that the Delhi conurbation was virtually abandoned in favour of Daulatābād early in Muḥammad's reign. We should note at this juncture that 'Delhi' was a term applied equally to the original city wrested from its Hindu rulers in the twelfth century and to the entire complex of towns that had grown up since;⁷⁵ and Baranī, at least, distinguishes on occasions between old Delhi (*shahr*—'the city' par excellence) and the neighbouring settlements.⁷⁶ What actually happened around 1327⁷⁷ was that the principal Muslim residents of the old city, together with their dependants and their considerable households, were despatched south.⁷⁸ The exception was the military personnel. Baranī states clearly that 'the *amirs*, *maliks* and troops' remained with the Sultan in the north when their families were in Daulatābād;⁷⁹ and Iṣāmī's bitter allusions to the repopulation of the capital with Hindus⁸⁰ surely refer in part to the drafting of peasants for the Khurāsān expedition. The old city, therefore, was not deserted, precisely because it was in the process of becoming a vast barracks. This provides a strong indication of the essential coherence of Muḥammad's policy. The two projects—the recruitment of the Khurāsān force and the emigration to Daulatābād—had to coincide⁸¹ in order to minimise the increase in

consumption in Delhi and the setting of impossible targets for the grain-producers. Nor does it appear that the Sultan had totally miscalculated. It is significant that Baranī attributes the disbandment of the Khurāsān force after one year not to a shortage of supplies but to a lack of sufficient funds to pay its wages.⁸²

Muhammad's error lay in demanding excessive cash amounts from the Dōāb cultivators, over and above their grain contributions. It is possible that he was driven to this expedient by monetary fluctuations about which we are all too imperfectly informed. His introduction of a so-called token currency (in reality, simply low denomination coins) has been seen as a response to a chronic silver shortage.⁸³ Certainly the flow of silver to Delhi would be greatly reduced after the loss of Bengal around 1335–6,⁸⁴ but at this earlier juncture the treasury may have been suffering more from a decrease in the value of its gold reserves, since it appears that the price of gold was falling. An Iranian author writing in 1339–40 tells us that as a result of Muhammad's heavy expenditure (and, by implication, the release of large quantities of gold into the Indian economy) it was no longer profitable to export gold from Iran to India, and the direction of this traffic was now reversed.⁸⁵ At any rate, the new copper and bronze coins, which Baranī at one point explicitly connects with the enlistment of the Khurāsān army,⁸⁶ came to be rejected by the public, in all likelihood because of the great number of counterfeit coins that were soon in circulation,⁸⁷ and the scheme was discarded. It may have been in part this same desire for specie which prompted the Sultan to launch the ill-fated Qarāchīl expedition around 1332–3.⁸⁸ But Baranī's frequent statements that the treasury was emptied as a result of Muhammad's policies should be treated with caution. Had this been the case, the government would have been in no position to redeem the 'token' coins⁸⁹ (although it possibly did so at a discount); still less would Muhammad have advanced huge sums, at a time when his revenues were drastically curtailed by the rebellions in Bengal and the south, to the peasants for the purposes of restoring cultivation.⁹⁰

By 1335–6 the Daulatabād project in turn had been abandoned: not because it was intrinsically unworkable, but because the original motives behind the emigration were now redundant. That one of these motives had been simply to cream off a part of Delhi's enormous population is hinted in at least one source.⁹¹ But the choice of Daulatabād had been dictated by geographical considerations. The city not only lay within the newly annexed territories in the south;

it was also centrally situated in relation to the empire as a whole.⁹² For a time the Sultanate was regarded as possessing two capitals,⁹³ and it may be that Muhammad envisaged ultimately making Daulatabād the actual seat of government. If so, the ambition was never realized. When the Deccan grew exposed to enemy attack with the secession of Mabar and disturbances in Warangal, Muhammad allowed those of the emigrants who so wished to return to their homes in Delhi.⁹⁴ Probably he was swayed not least by the fact that since the disbandment of the Khurāsān force much of the old city, as Ibn Batūṭa observed on his arrival in India, was uninhabited.⁹⁵

NOTES

1. Jūzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāsrī*, 2nd ed., Abd al-Hayy Habībī (Kābul, 1342–3 sh./1963–4, 2 vols.), I, pp. 417, 444; tr. H. G. Raverty, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāsrī: a general history of the Muhammadan dynasties of Asia* (London, 1873–81, 2 vols., Bibliotheca Indica), I, pp. 525–6, 605; Hasan Nizāmī, *Tāj al-maʿāthir*, B.L. MS Add. 7, 623, ff. 84^v–86^v.
2. *Tārīkh-i Fakhriʿ-d-dīn Muḥarrakshāh*, [sic] ed. Sir E. D. Ross (London, 1927, James G. Fortlong Fund), p. 30 (*markaz-i Islām-i Hind*). Cf. also Hasan Nizāmī, p. 81^v.
3. See generally A. B. M. Habibullah, *The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India*, 2nd ed. (Allahabad, 1961), pp. 92–6.
4. Jūzjānī, I, pp. 440–1 (tr. Raverty, pp. 598–9). Cf. also Baranī, *Tārīkh-i Firuz-shāhī*, ed. S. A. Khān (Calcutta, 1860–2, Bibliotheca Indica), p. 27; Isāmī, *Futūḥ al-salātīn*, ed. A. S. Usha (Madras, 1948), pp. 114–15, tr. A. M. Husain, *Futūḥ al-salātīn or Shāh Nāmā-i Hind of Isāmī* (Aligarh, 1967–77, 3 vols.), II, pp. 226–7.
5. Firishṭa, *Gulshan-i Ibrāhīmī*, lithograph ed. (Bombay, 1247/1831–2, 2 vols.), I, p. 131, quoting the lost 14th-century work of Shaykh Ayn al-Dīn Bijāpūrī. For the civil war in the Mongol empire, see P. Jackson, 'The dissolution of the Mongol empire', *CAJ*, XXII (1978), pp. 227 ff.
6. Jūzjānī, I, p. 456, & II, p. 83 (tr. Raverty, I, pp. 634, 636, & II, pp. 856–7).
7. Baranī, p. 219.
8. Ibn Batūṭa, *Tuhfat al-nuẓẓār fī gharāib al-amṣār*, ed. & tr. C. Defrémery & B. R. Sanguinetti, *Voyages d'Ibn Batoutah* (Paris, 1853–8, 4 vols.), III, p. 146; tr. H. A. R. Gibb, *The Travels of Ibn Batūṭa A.D. 1325–1354* (Cambridge, 1958–71, 3 vols. Hakluyt Society, CX, CXVII, CXL), III, pp. 618–19.
9. *Ibn Fadlallāh al-Omārī's Bericht über Indien in seinem Werke Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār*, ed. & tr. Otto Spies (Leipzig, 1943, Sammlung Orientalischer Arbeiten, XIV), text p. 11, tr. p. 36.
10. *Ibid.*, text p. 12, tr. p. 36.
11. Mufaḍḍal, *Al-nabī al-sādīd*, ed. & tr. Samira Kortanamer, *Ägypten und Syrien zwischen 1317 und 1341 in der Chronik des Mufaḍḍal b. Abī l-Faḍāil* (Freiburg i. Br., 1973, Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, 23), text p. 28, tr. p. 105.

12. Baranī, p. 474; cf. also p. 341, in the cultural context, where it is further claimed to be the equal of Constantinople and Jerusalem.
13. Ibid., p. 81.
14. See Jackson, 'The Dissolution', pp. 238–44.
15. René Grousset, *L'Empire des Steppes* (4th ed., Paris, 1965), p. 412; see further, Jean Aubin, 'L'éthnogenèse des Qaraunas', *Turcaica*, I (1969), pp. 83–4.
16. Baranī, p. 254.
17. All the Indian sources are agreed on Kālī as the site of the engagement. For a discussion of its possible location, see S. H. Hodivala, *Studies in Indo-Muslim History* (Bombay, 1939–57, 2 vols.), I, p. 271. Of the sources not available to Hodivala, Isāmī (p. 259, tr. Husain, II, p. 430) says that it lay in the Dēāb, while a variant in an earlier recension of Baranī's work specifies that Alā al-Dīn advanced 7 *kurūhs* (about 15 miles) from Delhi to the battlefield: Bodleian Library MS Elliot 353, f° 145^r.
18. Amīr Khusrav, *Deval Rānī*, lithograph ed. Rashīd Ahmad (Aligarh, 1336/1917), p. 61. See also the Iranian authors: *Rashīd al-Dīn's History of India*, ed. Karl Jahn (The Hague, 1965. Central Asiatic Studies, X), Arabic text p. 20, Pers. text pp. 75, 118; Kāshānī, *Tārīkh-i Ujjiyān Sultān*, ed. Gavin R. Hambly (Tehran, 1348 sh./1969), pp. 193, 201, where Qutluḡ Qoçha's invasion is duplicated.
19. Baranī, pp. 201–2. The spelling Taraghāi is preferable to the form 'Targhī' usually adopted by Indian historians: cf. W. Radloff, *Versuch eines Wörterbuches der Türk-Dialecte* (St Petersburg, 1893–1911, 4 vols.), III, col. 840 (E. Turkish taraghāi: 'hawk').
20. Wassaīf, *Tarziyat al-amār wa tazjiyat al-asār*, lithograph ed. (Bombay, 1269/1853), p. 526. Amīr Khusrav, *Khazā in al-fuḥl*, ed. M. Wahid Mirzā (Calcutta, 1953. Bibliotheca Indica), p. 38, speaks of the inhabitants making for the Ganga crossings. On this invasion, see generally K. S. Lal, *History of the Khaljis A.D. 1290–1320*, 2nd ed. (Calcutta, 1967), pp. 144–5.
21. Isāmī, pp. 463–5 (tr. Husain, III, pp. 698–700), for the attack on the Mirāth region. For the Dēāb, cf. Muhammad Bihāmād-khānī, *Tārīkh-i Muḥammadi*, B.L. MS Or. 137, f° 400^r; Yahyā b. Ahmad Shīrīndī, *Tārīkh-i Muḥarrak-i ḡhābi*, ed. S. M. H. Husain (Calcutta, 1931. Bibliotheca Indica), p. 101. On the authenticity of this invasion, which had been questioned, see Jackson, 'The Mongols and the Delhi Sultanate in the reign of Muhammad Tughluq (1325–1351)', *CAJ*, XIX (1975), pp. 119–26.
22. Baranī, pp. 319–20.
23. See W. Barthold, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*, tr. V. & T. Minorsky (Leiden, 1956–62, 4 vols. in 3), I, pp. 129–33; Grousset, pp. 410–12 (and for the internal wars of 1313–20) 413–14; Jackson, *CAJ*, XIX, pp. 143–5 (for the period after 1330).
24. See the 10th century *Ḥudūd al-ālam*, tr. V. Minorsky, 2nd ed. C. E. Bosworth (London, 1970), Gibb Memorial Series, n.s., XI, p. 89, for the total of 150,000 horse attributed to the ruler of Kanauj alone. The corresponding statistic found in Masūdī a few decades earlier is wildly exaggerated: *Murāj al-ḡhbab*, ed. & tr. C. Barbier de Meynard & Pavet de Courteille, *Les Prairies d'Or* (Paris, 1861–77, 9 vols.), I, p. 374.
25. Jūzjānī, II, p. 83 (tr. Raverty, II, p. 856).
26. Baranī, p. 86.

27. Ibid., p. 340. Cf. also the views retailed to Mufaḍḍal later: Kortantamer, text p. 29 (*jannada l-junūd wa l-asākir*), tr. p. 109.
28. Wassaīf, p. 309; hence *Rashīd al-Dīn's 'History of India'*, Arabic text, p. 15, Persian text pp. 68, 112.
29. Wassaīf, p. 528 (in the portion of his work completed c. 727/1327): the figure is ultimately reproduced by Firūzī (I, pp. 199–200), in the context of Alā al-Dīn's reforms, but the intermediate authority is difficult to identify.
30. Baranī, pp. 476–7. On the Khurāsān project, see now Jackson, *CAJ*, XIX, pp. 128 ff.
31. Spies, text pp. 12–13, tr. p. 37.
32. Safādī, *Al-wāfi bil-wafayāt*, ed. Sven Dederling, *Das biographische Lexicon des Šahpādīn Ḥalī ibn Aibak as-Safādī*, III (Damascus, 1953. Bibliotheca Islamica, VI), p. 173; cf., however, his *Ayār al-asr*, MS Süleimaniye Kütüphanesi, Istanbul, Asir Efendi 588, f° 2^v, with 7 for 9. Ibn Ḥajar al-Asqalānī, *Al-durar al-kāminā* (Hyderabad, 1348–50/1929–32, 4 vols.), III, p. 461, follows *Al-wāfi*, but quoting only the lower number of 600,000.
33. Kortantamer, text p. 27, tr. p. 104 (though the number of horse is extraordinarily high).
34. The figure given in the earlier recension: Bodleian MS, f° 201^v; MS in private collection of Simon Digby, p. 167^r. In the standard version (Baranī, p. 477) it is reduced to 370,000. I am most grateful to Mr Digby for lending me a photostat copy of his MS and for allowing me to consult the original.
35. S. Digby, *War-horse and Elephant in the Delhi Sultanate: a Study of Military Supplies* (Oxford–Karachi, 1971), p. 24 & n. 41a, compares Baranī's figure with those given for Alā al-Dīn's reign, which make it appear far less remarkable. But the evidence of other sources suggests that this was a special army, falling well short of the total numbers under arms in Muhammad's empire: see Firūzī, I, p. 240.
36. Cf. Baranī, *Fatāwa-yi Jahāndārī*, I.O. MS 1149, f° 73^v, for the importance attached to this.
37. See Baranī, p. 55; Spies, text p. 19, tr. p. 44 (hunting expeditions involving 100,000 troops in Muhammad b. Tughluq's reign); Alfī, *Tārīkh-i Firūz-shāhī*, ed. M. V. Husain (Calcutta, 1888–91. Bibliotheca Indica), p. 321 (for a large tract in Rohilkhand reserved for the chase under Firūz Shāh). In all probability, the expedition to the Baran region around 1333 by Muhammad, which has been defined as a 'manhunt' by certain secondary authorities, following Baranī's account (pp. 479–80) was really the same sort of manoeuvre.
38. Cf. Juwaynī, *Tārīkh-i Jahān-Gushā*, tr. J. A. Boyle, *History of the World-Conqueror* (Manchester, 1958, 2 vols.), I, pp. 27–8.
39. Jūzjānī, II, p. 57 (tr. Raverty, II, p. 816).
40. Baranī, pp. 50–1.
41. Ibid., p. 302: later (pp. 325–6) he qualifies this by asserting that Alā al-Dīn resumed his more adventurous policy when the construction work at Sirī (see below) was finished; though it is clear that Sirī was completed only under his son Qutb al-Dīn.
42. Ibid., p. 323, where they are mentioned for the first time, in connection with their assignment to *wālīs* and *muqats*. For the Sevāna and Jālōr campaigns, see Lal, pp. 115–19.

43. See P. Hardy, 'Dihlī Sultanate', *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. (Leiden-London, 1954), II, p. 269. The annexation of Dēōgīr (1318) and of Tilang and Mabar (c. 1322) and the reconquest of Bengal (c. 1324) meant that the Sultanate came to embrace the greater part of the subcontinent within an extremely short period. It is to this process of expansion that Baranī (pp. 468-9) is referring when he describes the unprecedented scope and efficiency of the revenue system during the early years of Muhammad b. Tughluq.
44. The dangers were obvious even to Baranī, who saw the absorption of fresh territories as leading to the loss of older provinces (pp. 471, 472); though he also blames the Sultan's allegedly chimerical projects such as the *Khurāsān* enterprise (p. 471).
45. See, for example, *ibid.*, p. 212; Iṣāmī, pp. 217 ff. (tr. Husain, II, pp. 383 ff.).
46. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, III, p. 146 (tr. Gibb, III, p. 621).
47. Baranī, pp. 300-1, 302: this further prevented Delhi acquiring reinforcements from the eastern provinces.
48. Bihāmād-khānī, p. 400^r.
49. Baranī, pp. 323-4: on the significance of *maḥṣūl* as 'revenue-demand' rather than 'produce', at least from the time of Afīf, see W. H. Moreland, *The Agrarian System of Moslem India* (Cambridge, 1929), pp. 232 n.1, 249. For the Delhi *kāṛḥānahā*, cf. I. H. Qureshi, *The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi*, 5th ed. (New Delhi, 1971), pp. 69 ff. (where the term is translated as departments of the commissariat); and for an example, see Spies, text p. 14, tr. p. 40.
50. Baranī, pp. 305-6.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 287: the area in question is defined at p. 288 and included not merely Delhi and the Dāb but Lahore and Dēōpālpūr. On the Hanīfīe prescription, cf. N. P. Aghnides, *Mohammedan Theories of Finance* (New York, 1916), pp. 379-80.
52. Baranī, pp. 284-6.
53. Although Baranī claims that it was intended simply to reduce the incidence of convivial gatherings that might lead to conspiracy and rebellion. According to Sir George Watt, *A Dictionary of the Economic Products of India* (London-Calcutta, 1889-93, 6 vols. in 9), VI/4, pp. 273-4, the grapes of the N.W. provinces and Avadh are hardly suitable for the manufacture of wine, and Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, III, p. 129 (tr. Gibb, III, p. 610) confirms that the grape was rare in India in his time, though found in the Delhi region and one other province whose name is blank in all the MSs. Nevertheless, we do find indications in other sources that wine production was prominent in Avadh and in Kōl and Mīrāth, all regions which were the object of Alā al-Dīn's economic measures: see Baranī, p. 157; M. W. Mīrṣā, *The Life and Works of Amir Khusrāw* (Calcutta, 1935), p. 72.
54. Amir Khusrāw, *Khazāin*, pp. 21-3; *Rasāil al-ijāz*, lithograph ed. (Lucknow, 1876, 5 vols. in 2), I, pp. 19-20. See Baranī, pp. 303-4, and for specific prices pp. 305, 310, 314, 315.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 382 for the troops' pay; p. 383 for the reduction in the *khurāj*; pp. 384-5 for the rise in prices.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 382-3.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 439.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 431-2, for the revenues conceded to the *muqāṭas* and *wālīs* over and

- above their stipends (*maẓājīb*); and cf. the more general observations at pp. 438-40.
59. Moreland, p. 48 n.1. The phrase used by Baranī (p. 473), *yakī bi-dah wa yakī bi-bisr*, does not occur in his first recension (see below). But it is interestingly echoed in his *Fatāwa-yi Jahāndārī*, p. 192^v, where we read of an increased revenue-demand of *yakī bi-panj wa yakī bi-dah* levied on the cultivators by an apocryphal tyrant Yazdagird for the purpose of raising an enormous army. Yazdagird in fact bears a marked resemblance to Muhammad b. Tughluq.
60. Yahyā b. Ahmad, *Tārīkh-i Mubārak-shāhi*, p. 113, is the first author to refer explicitly to its effect upon the province.
61. Bodleian MS, p. 192^v; MS Digby Coll., p. 161^r.
62. See Baranī, p. 574 (under the reign of Firūz Shāh); also *Fatāwa*, loc. cit., where the revenue-demand is defined as *jizya wa kharāj*. Baranī's usage puzzled Moreland (p. 231 n.1), but that an illegal *jizya* assessed on property (*jizya-yi tayāl*) had existed prior to Firūz Shāh's reforms is confirmed by that monarch in his *Fatāhāt-i Firūz-shāhi*, ed. Shaikh Abdur Rashid (Aligarh, 1954), p. 5 (with *tambūl* in error).
63. Moreland, pp. 48-9.
64. Baranī, p. 130.
65. *Ibid.*, pp. 173, 175 ff.
66. Baranī's references to 'Delhi' during his coverage of Jalāl al-Dīn's reign seem to refer to the general conurbation rather than to the old city: cf. pp. 187, 212, 228, where the Sultan is based at Kūlkhri.
67. *Ibid.*, pp. 255, 259, 301. Sīrī had earlier served as Jalāl al-Dīn's *ard-gāh* before setting out on campaign: Amir Khusrāw, *Miftāh al-fatāh*, ed. Shaikh Abdur Rashid (Aligarh, 1954), pp. 23, 25.
68. Baranī, p. 302. For its completion by Quṭb al-Dīn, see Amir Khusrāw, *Mub Sīrī*, ed. M. W. Mīrṣā (Oxford-London, 1950), pp. 76-80.
69. *Khazāin*, pp. 27-8; also Baranī, p. 302. The cement for this fortification later included the blood of Mongols captured during Kōpek's invasion around 1306 (*Khazāin*, pp. 45-6).
70. Baranī, pp. 436-7; this was overlooked by Hilary Waddington, *Ādilābād: A Part of the "Fourth" Delhi*, *Ancient India*, I (1946), p. 62 n.9, who assumed that the capital 'deserted' under Muhammad was Tughluqābād.
71. Baranī, p. 476; but cf. p. 468, where treasure is mentioned as being stored in Hazār Sūtūn.
72. See A. M. Husain, *The Rise and Fall of Muhammad bin Tughluq* (London, 1938; reprint, Delhi, 1972), pp. 117-19; *Tughluq Dynasty* (Calcutta, 1963), pp. 166-8.
73. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, III, pp. 220, 399 (tr. Gibb, III, pp. 660, 746). Husain thinks that the Hazār Sūtūn palace was founded by Muhammad: *Rise and Fall*, p. 119 n.2; *Tughluq Dynasty*, pp. 169 n.3, 172. But this is not actually supported by the authority he quotes, the *Qasāid* of Badr-i Chāchī: see lithograph ed. M. Hādī Ali (Kanpur, n.d.), p. 53. And Baranī's first recension states categorically that it was the work of Alā al-Dīn (MS Digby Coll., p. 114^r); in any case, the standard version shows that it had been the later Khālīs' residence (Baranī, pp. 284, 396, 403, etc.). At one point Iṣāmī suggests that Muhammad was residing at the Dār al-Khilāfat, i.e. Sūrī (p. 466; tr. Husain, III, p. 702); though we know from Umarī's sources that he moved from palace to palace (Spies, text p. 18, tr. p. 44).

74. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, III, p. 147 (tr. Gibb, III, pp. 619, 621).
75. Spies, text pp. 11, 12, tr. p. 36. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, III, p. 146 (tr. Gibb, III, p. 619).
76. E.g., Baranī, pp. 449–50.
77. For the date, see Baranī's first recension, Bodleian MS p. 190^v; MS Digby Coll., f. 159v.
78. Baranī, p. 473 (*ḡhawāṣṣ-i khaḷq; mardum-i guzida wa ghida*); cf. *Rise and Fall*, pp. 110 ff.; *Tughluq Dynasty*, pp. 146 ff.
79. Baranī, p. 479.
80. Isāmī, pp. 450, 453 (tr. Husain, III, pp. 680–1, 684–5). Cf. also Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, III, p. 316 (tr. Gibb, III, p. 708), who speaks simply of 'the inhabitants of the provinces'.
81. As Muḥammad b. Mubārak (Mir-i Khwurd), *Siyar al-awliyā*, lithograph ed. (Delhi, 1302/1885), p. 271, implies that they did.
82. Baranī, p. 477.
83. See Ishwari Prasad, *A History of the Qarānah Turks in India* (Allahabad, 1936, vol. I), pp. 105 ff. Husain (*Rise and Fall*, pp. 132–3; *Tughluq Dynasty*, pp. 186–7) qualifies the view expressed earlier by H. Nelson Wright, *The Coinage and Metrology of the Sultāns of Delhi* (Delhi, 1936), p. 400.
84. According to Yahyā b. Ahmad, Qadr Khān, the governor of Bengal, was amassing great quantities of coined silver to send to Delhi at the time of the province's revolt: *Tārīkh-i Mubārak-shāhi*, p. 104 (his date 739/1338–9 is incorrect: both Isāmī, p. 472, tr. Husain, III, p. 709, and Baranī, p. 480, imply that the rebellion occurred around the time of the secession of Mabar and of Muḥammad's Kanauj campaign, on which cf. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, III, p. 144, tr. Gibb, III, p. 617). On the plentiful silver coinage of Bengal during the period of its independence, see Digby, *War-horse and Elephant*, p. 44 & n.121.
85. Ḥamd-allāh Mustawfī Qazwīnī, *Nuzhat al-qulūb*, ed. Guy Le Strange, *The Geographical Part of the Nuzhat al-Qulub* (Leiden–London, 1915–19, 2 vols., Gibb Memorial Series, XXIII/1 & 2), I (text), p. 230, II (trans.), p. 222.
86. Baranī, p. 475.
87. *Ibid.* There is a parallel instance in contemporary Egypt: see H. Rabie, *The Financial System of Egypt A.H. 564–741/A.D. 1169–1341* (Oxford–London, 1972), pp. 195–7.
88. See Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, III, pp. 325–8 (tr. Gibb, III, pp. 713–14); Jackson, *CAJ*, XIX, pp. 132 ff. The date is suggested by N. V. Ramanayya, 'The date of the rebellions of Tilang and Kampila against Sultan Muḥammad bin Tughlaq', *Indian Culture*, V (1938–9), p. 140 n.1. The 'token' coins range from 730 to 732/1329 to 1332 (Nelson Wright, pp. 139–46). Baranī makes it clear that the Qarāḡhīl force was a part of the army raised for Khurāsān (p. 477).
89. *Ibid.*, p. 476.
90. *Ibid.*, pp. 498–9.
91. Isāmī, p. 466 (tr. Husain, III, p. 702): the context is the Qarāḡhīl campaign, which Isāmī depicts as a deliberate ploy by Muḥammad to reduce the surplus population!
92. Baranī, pp. 473–4. See also Šafādī, *Al-waṣāfi*, III, p. 174; *Ayān*, f. 2^r.
93. Spies, text pp. 7, 32; tr. pp. 29, 59.
94. Baranī, p. 481: his edict was issued at the time of setting out for Tilang, i.e. presumably at the outset of the abortive Mabar campaign, in 1334.

95. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, III, p. 316 (tr. Gibb, III, p. 708). Husain (*Rise and Fall*, pp. 121–3; *Tughluq Dynasty*, pp. 171–3), assumed that this remark was based on hearsay and hence unreliable; but if we accept that it applies only to old Delhi, it does not contradict Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's other observations.

Abbreviations

B.L.	British Library
CAJ	Central Asiatic Journal